The British Empire and the fashioning of Muslim identity by Robinson, Francis
  
1
 The British Empire and Muslim Identity in South Asia 
 
 Francis Robinson  
 
     British Empire in India saw major transformations in the 
identities of its Indian subjects.  The growth of the modern 
state, the introduction of new systems of knowledge, the 
expansion of capitalist modes of production, and the spread of 
communications of all forms - railway, telegraph, post, press - 
made possible the fashioning of all kinds of new identities at 
local, regional and supra-regional levels.  One of the identities 
which developed most strikingly was the Muslim.  Indeed, at 
independence in 1947 it gained the particular accolade of 
embracing its own modern state in the shape of Pakistan. This 
political outcome, however, was just part of an extraordinary 
series of developments in Muslim identities under British rule 
which shed light not just on the nature of British rule but also 
on major changes at work in Muslim society. 
     That Muslim identity would become a prime theatre of 
activity did not seem likely in the eighteenth century.  Amongst 
Muslims who were descended from, or who liked to claim that they 
were descended from, those who had migrated to India to seek 
service at its many Muslim courts - Turks, Persians, Arabs, 
Afghans - their Muslim identity was not a matter of overriding 
concern. At the courts of the Mughals they divided not into Hindu 
and Muslim factions but into Turkish and Persian ones.  They 
shared their Persian high culture with Hindus, including their 
poetry which rejected Indian life and landscape as fit subjects 
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for poetic response and found its imaginative horizons in Iran 
and Central Asia.  Family was an important source identity 
zealously maintained in family histories, most especially if 
claiming descent from the Prophet.  Place of settlement was also 
a source if identity exemplified by the custom which grew upon in 
the eighteenth century of scholars, poets and administrators, as 
they travelled in search of patronage, adopting the names of 
their home qasbah, hence `Bilgrami', `Mohani' or `Rudaulwi'. As 
the eighteenth century progressed, and Shias came to assert 
themselves notably in the Mughal successor states of Murshidabad 
and Awadh, Shia and Sunni came to be, from time to time, 
significant badges of difference amongst Muslims. Amongst these, 
and other possibilities, the category Muslim was not of 
overriding importance. Learned men (`ulama), whose job it was to 
police the boundaries of community behaviour, would make a point 
of drawing a distinction between what was Muslim religious 
practice and that of non-Muslims, but this for the most part was 
as far as things went. 
     Amongst Muslims who were descended from converts to Islam, 
that is the vast majority of Muslims who expressed themselves 
through the regional cultures and languages of India - Bengali, 
Tamil, Malayalam, Gujarati, Sindhi, Punjabi and so on - the 
distinctions of language, metaphor and behaviour between Muslims 
and the wider society in which they moved have seemed so slight 
to some that they have referred to an Islamic syncretistic 
tradition in Bengal(1) or one Indian religion expressed through 
different religious idioms in the Tamil country of the south.(2) 
Scholars differ as to precisely what meaning should be attributed 
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to the forms of religious expression of Muslim convert 
populations. What is clear, however, is that their's was a piety 
of local Sufi cults in which, more often than not, people of all 
faiths might participate and which might be expressed as much 
through regional `Hindu' idioms as through those classically 
understood to be Muslim. Such was the nature of Muslim identities 
in the eighteenth century that many have been able to see them as 
part of a working `composite culture'.(3) Such an understanding, 
nevertheless, should always be qualified by noting that some 
Muslims had a cultural and imaginative reach that went well 
beyond the borders of South Asia and that the leading Muslim 
scholar of the first half of the eighteenth century, Shah Wali 
Allah of Delhi (d. 1762), was able to declare that `we are an 
Arab people whose fathers have fallen in exile in the country of 
Hindustan, and Arabic genealogy and Arabic language are our 
pride.'(4) 
     The period of British rule, which eventually became British 
empire, brought distinct new strands, indeed firmer edges, to 
Muslim identities. There was a sharpening of the distinction 
between Muslim and non-Muslim, which was in part an outcome of 
the impact of British understandings of India and in part that of 
religious revivalism. There was also the development of a 
separate Muslim political identity against the claims of an all-
inclusive Indian national identity. Parallel with this last 
process a pan-Islamic dimension to Indo-Muslim consciousness 
emerged, which for a time between 1919 and 1924 threatened to 
engulf Muslim politics.  The gendering of Muslim identity was a 
feature as women became a key part of the battlefield across 
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which the discourse of Muslim progress was fought. Finally, there 
were trends towards individualism, towards asserting individual 
fulfilment against community obligation, which were arguably part 
of a process of secularising Muslim identity and the emergence of 
Muslims who were purely Muslim by culture. 
     That such remarkable developments took place in the nature 
of Muslim identities during the period of British empire might 
suggest that the British presence had a powerful role to play. 
Certainly it was influential. But it is crucial not to ignore the 
powerful element of Muslim agency at work. Each new strand that 
went to shape Muslim identities under British rule will be 
examined bearing in mind the questions why did they emerge and 
what do they mean. 
 
1.   The sharpening of the distinction between Muslim and non- 
     Muslim 
     It has long been part of Indian nationalist 
historiographical tradition that the British privileged religious 
identities in India over other possibilities, which inevitably 
helped to sharpen distinctions between Muslim and non-Muslim. An 
important part of this process has come to be seen to be the 
British construction of knowledge about India, and the ways in 
which this construction not only influenced British governance 
but also Indian ideas about themselves.  From the very beginning 
of the serious study of India in the eigheenth century, Warren 
Hastings and the orientalists around him - Jones, Halhed, Wilkins 
- thought of India in terms of Hindus and Muslims. The former 
were seen to have enjoyed a great classical civilisation to 1200 
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AD while the latter were interlopers in the subcontinent whose 
empire from the thirteenth century coincided with decline of 
classical Indian civilisation. The orientalists sought classical 
texts to guide them in government and the administration of 
justice, for instance Halhed's Code of Gentoo Laws derived from 
the Sanskrit sastras of the Brahmins or Burhan al-Din 
Marghinani's Hidaya compiled in Central Asia in the twelfth 
century, rather than grappling with the complexities of the 
Indian present. When the British came to place a framework of 
interpretation over India's past, they divided it into Hindu, 
Muslim and British periods. When from 1871 they began their 
decennial census of their Indian empire, they tabulated its 
peoples under religious headings. When they described their 
empire in imperial and provincial gazetteers, they gave 
substantial consideration to their Indian peoples as religious 
groupings down to the level of district and small town.(5)  For 
much of the nineteenth century, moreover, this tendency to 
interpret Indian society in terms of religion was reinforced by 
the committed Christian beliefs of a good number of 
administrators and the presence of many missionary organisations. 
     In this context the category Muslim became a major part of 
the discourse of the colonial state, both within itself and with 
society at large. Much social action, whether it be competition 
for jobs in government offices or riots in town and countryside, 
was interpreted in terms of Muslim and Hindu rivalry. While 
Muslims, themselves, when they came face to face with the state 
more often that not had to define themselves primarily as 
Muslims. They did so to the census enumerator or when they signed 
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up to join the army; they did so when they went to school or 
hospital; they did so when they came to vote. The outcome was 
that men and women, whose Muslimness might not have been 
prominent in their consciousness of themselves, came to find it 
increasingly to be so. In the process they became more aware of 
what might distinguish them from non-Muslims, as for instance 
those Bengali Muslims of the late nineteenth century who stopped 
invoking God as Sri Sri Iswar in favour of Allaho Akbar and who 
dropped their Hindu surnames (Chand, Pal, Dutt) in favour of 
Muslim ones (Siddiqui, Yusufzai, Qureshi).(6) 
     It would, however, be wrong to regard the British as playing 
the only role in privileging the Muslim category and in 
sharpening distinctions between Muslim and non-Muslim. Of great 
importance was the movement of revival and reform which has in 
various ways striven to vitalise Muslim life on the subcontinent 
from the early nineteenth century to the present.  This was not 
just an Indian phenomenon but an Islam-wide one, as Muslims 
strove in various ways to find answers to their loss of power in 
the world, but it did achieve a particular force and variety of 
expression in British India. Among the manifestations of the 
movement were: the jihad movement of the mujahidin of Sayyid 
Ahmad Barelwi (d.1831) in northern India,(7) that of Sayyid Fadl 
Alawi in Malabar,(8) and that of Hajji Shari`at Allah (d.1838) in 
Bengal;(9) there were the movements of Deoband and the Ahl-i 
Hadith in the later nineteenth century;(10) and those of the 
Tablighi Jama`at and the Jama`at-i Islami in the twentieth.(11) 
Common to all these movements was an attack on all religious 
practices, which could be conceived of as having a Hindu element, 
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and a concern to assert their understanding of `pure' Islamic 
practice. The records of India's learned and holy families speak 
of the passing of this spirit through the towns and villages of 
the land, of the debates that were held and of the compromises 
that were made to accommodate the new boundaries of acceptable 
`Islamic' behaviour.(12) 
     Side by side with the attack on Hindu practices there was 
also an assault on all behaviour at saints' shrines which 
suggested that the believer sought the saint's intercession for 
him with God. At its conception Islam had been profoundly this-
worldly, but with the development of its mystical dimensions it 
had acquired a substantial other-worldly focus. Now, with the 
assault on intercession, there was to be a profound shift back 
towards this-worldly piety. Salvation was to be achieved only by 
action on earth.  Particular force was given to this requirement 
by the colonial context.  In the absence of Muslim power to 
enforce the holy law, Muslims had to use their individual 
conscience and will to ensure that the law was observed.  To 
achieve this there was a new emphasis on literacy, on the 
translation of basic works of scholarship on guidance from Arabic 
and Persian into Indian languages, and on the making of them 
widely available through the use of the printing press. There 
began the era of chapbooks and how-to-be-Muslim guides, which can 
be found down to the present in the bazaars and bookshops of 
India and the wider Muslim world.(13) When the time came in the 
early twentieth century to reach beyond the literate, the 
Tablighi Jama`at or Preaching Society sprang up with the mission 
to transmit orally its essential Islamic message and to exemplify 
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in the dress and activities of its missionaries the basic 
standards of `Islamic' behaviour.(14) 
     The new `willed' or quasi-protestant Islam did much to 
sharpen the distinctions between Muslim and non-Muslim. But for 
one Muslim, Sayyid Abul A`la Mawdudi, who is arguably the most 
influential Islamic thinker of the twentieth century, it did not 
go nearly far enough. Responding, as Syed Vali Nasr has recently 
shown, to threats in the 1920s and 1930s which Hindu 
assertiveness seemed to represent to Indian Muslims, he created 
his vision of a hermetically sealed Islamic world in which all 
human understanding and all human activity would be subject to 
revelation. State power, moreover, would be used to put into 
effect the law derived from revelation.(15) 
     Of course, the Muslim movement of revival and reform and 
British rule interacted with each other in shaping definitions of 
Muslim distinctiveness. Muslim jihad movements and fears of the 
implacable opposition of so-called Wahhabis were sources of 
constant concern to the British down to World War One. 
`Fanatical' was the epithet most commonly applied to Muslims, and 
it was one which only gained force in the late nineteenth century 
as information flowed into India of British encounters with 
Muslims elsewhere in the empire, say in the Sudan or 
Somaliland.(16) Aspects of Muslim revivalism certainly helped to 
underpin the British construction of India in religious terms.  
On the other hand, British rule and the cultural challenges it 
brought also contributed to sharpening Muslim senses of 
difference. Not only was there a concern to police the boundaries 
between Muslim and Hindu behaviour but also those between Muslim 
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and European behaviour. The fatwa literature, the writings of the 
`ulama, and the guidance of Sufi pirs were full of responses to 
society's anxieties as to what European customs and innovations 
it might be permissible to adopt.  Could electric light be used 
in a mosque? Could European customs of eating at table with 
knives, forks and spoons be followed? Could European dress be 
worn? How far could women be permitted the freedom of their 
European cousins?  The presence of the British and the stream of 
changes they brought stimulated a continuing debate about where 
the boundaries of proper Muslim conduct might be.(17) 
 
2. The development of a Muslim political identity 
     If for the Indian nationalist historian the British 
privileged religious identities in general and the Muslim 
identity in particular, they are regarded as being even more 
responsible for the emergence and continuance of a Muslim 
political identity. The case might begin by showing how the 
colonial construction of knowledge helped to establish religious 
categories of thought in the mind of the Raj and then show how 
setting these groupings against each other was a policy some had 
very much in mind. `"Divide et impera" was the old Roman motto', 
declared Elphinstone, the distinguished early nineteenth century 
governor of Bombay, `and it should be ours'.(18) And, if such 
views were thought to be an aberration, they remained very much 
in the minds of late-nineteenth century administrators, whether 
it was the vigorous denial of Sir John Strachey in the 1880s that 
`nothing could be more opposed to the policy and universal 
practice of our Government in India than the old maxim of divide 
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and rule...'(19) or Sir Antony Macdonnell's open consideration of 
the possibilities,  `we are far more interested in [encouraging] 
a Hindu predominance', he wrote to Curzon in the 1890s, `than in 
[encouraging] a Mahomedan predominance, which, in the nature of 
things must be hostile to us.'(20) 
     Most scholars reject a crude `divide and rule' analysis in 
favour of noting British concerns to attract powerful allies to 
their side. Here the focus comes to rest on a particular dynamic 
which led to the establishment of a Muslim political identity in 
the developing democratic framework of the Raj. In the 1860s and 
1870s the British were particularly concerned about their failure 
to attract Muslims to their rule; it was a concern summed up in 
the title of W.W. Hunter's notorious tract The Indian Musalmans 
(1871), which was written in response to Viceroy Mayo's question 
`are the Indian Musalmans bound by their Religion to rebel 
against the Queen'. This meant that, when a group of north Indian 
Muslims, led by the gifted and energetic Sayyid Ahmad Khan, 
strove to build bridges between Islam and modern science and 
between Indian Muslims and the colonial state, they were looked 
upon with approval. When this group went on to found MAO College 
Aligarh in 1877 and the All-India Muhammadan Educational 
Conference in 1886 to carry the process forward, it received 
moral and material support from government. When this group, 
known as the Aligarh movement, made a point of not supporting the 
Indian national Congress, the organisation of Indian nationalism, 
the British were not displeased. Moreover, when representatives 
of this movement went in deputation to the Viceroy in 1906 to ask 
for special representation for Muslims and recognition of their 
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`political importance' in the new legislative councils announced 
by the Secretary of State, they were received with sympathy.  
Furthermore, when they applied enormous pressure as they Morley-
Minto Council reforms were going through Parliament, they were 
granted separate electorates for Muslims with extra seats, over 
and above their proportions of the population, in those provinces 
where they were `politically important'.(21) 
     British understandings of Indian society, British fears and 
British styles of rule all played their part in making possible 
the formal recognition of a Muslim political identity in the 
developing constitution of their Indian empire. Thus Muslims all 
over India were given a political identity which had been the 
concern mainly of the Muslims from the north. Separate 
electorates, moreover, were to remain a feature of the two 
subsequent devolutions of power in 1919 and 1935. While no direct 
line should be drawn between the establishment of a Muslim 
political identity in the constitution in 1909 and the emergence 
of Pakistan in 1947, it was one of many enabling developments. 
     The responsibility for the emergence of a Muslim political 
identity, however, cannot entirely be laid at the feet of the 
British. Significant attention needs to be given to processes 
within Indian society. There was the Hindu movement of revival 
and reform which, like that of the Muslims, was powered forward 
by the need to confront colonial rule and Western knowledge. A 
great ferment of activity was stimulated which in northern India 
led to the promotion of distinctive Hindu symbols such as the 
Nagri script (of Sanskrit) as against the Muslim Persian script 
then used in government, the increasing sanskritisation of Hindi 
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so as to differentiate it from Urdu, and the assertion of Hindu 
preferences in many localities with regard to cows or religious 
processions as against those of Muslims. Agitation for Hindi led 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan in 1869 to talk for the first time of working 
just for Muslims.(22) Recent attempts to make Nagri the script of 
government, which would put Muslims out of work, and bruising 
battles over religious preferences on municipal boards were part 
of the backdrop to the Muslim deputation to the Viceroy and its 
requests for privileges and protection. Indeed, the often close 
relationship between Hindu revivalism and the Congress was always 
going to make for a difficult relationship between Muslims and 
Indian nationalism.(23) 
     There was also the Muslim movement of revival and reform. 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan had his intellectual roots deep in the 
traditions of the Muslim revival. His Aligarh movement is the 
expression of that revival that has come to be known as Islamic 
modernism [which achieved its culmination in British India in the 
thought of Muhammad Iqbal who succeeded in building a bridge 
between Islam and the idea of progress, not least in the 
organisation of a modern state. It was suffused with memories of 
past Muslim glory and the need to restore that glory in the 
present.  The classic statement of its mood was Hali's Musaddas 
an elegy on the rise and fall of Islam composed in the 1870s at 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan's request. Readings from the poem would often 
be used to introduce educational and political meetings and with 
verses such as the following leave audiences in tears: 
     There is meanness in everything we do. Our ways are worse 
     than those of the most base. 
     Our forefathers' reputation has been eaten away by us. Our  
     step makes our countrymen ashamed. 
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     We have thrown away our ancestors' credit, and sunk the     
    nobility of the Arabs.(24) 
 
       Aligarh was designed to deal with this situation. Its 
alumni were to be the new Muslim elites of British India.  They 
were to form the All-India Muslim League in 1906 which fought for 
separate electorates and special privileges for Muslims in the 
Morley-Minto Council reforms.  They were the key supporters of 
the League as it strove in subsequent years to preserve the 
Muslim political identity.  Nevertheless, the vicissitudes in the 
support for this identity must be recorded. In the second decade 
of the twentieth century the young Muslim elites of northern 
India were firmly behind it. But in the 1920s support drained 
away: Muslim landlords joining landlord parties, young 
professionals joining the nationalist movement, and some leaving 
politics altogether. In the 1930s it virtually disappeared; only 
once between 1931 and 1936 did the Muslim League meet in full 
session, between 1931 and 1935 Jinnah, the League's key figure, 
had his main residence in London, while in the first general 
election after the 1935 Government of India Act it won only 
twenty-two per cent of the seats reserved for Muslims. It was 
only in the special circumstances of the 1940s that the League 
was able to give the Muslim political identity the broad appeal 
that enabled it to win over ninety per cent of the reserved 
Muslim seats in the elections of 1945-46.(25) 
 
3. British empire and the Pan-Islamic strand 
     Muslims have always had a special feeling for the idea of 
their community, their umma. At one level this might be 
acknowledged in the salam to neighbours during the act of prayer 
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or in the particular rites performed at a saint's shrine. An 
another level community might be understood in the fact that all 
Muslims belong to a community created by God's grace; they gave 
alms each year for the support of the community; they endured the 
privations of the Ramadan fast as one; and that they looked 
forward to the ultimate celebration of the community in the 
company of Muslims from all parts of the world during the annual 
pilgrimage to Mecca.  
     A feature of the Muslim world over the past century has been 
that more and more Muslims have developed a Pan-Islamic dimension 
to their consciousness; more and more have engaged imaginatively 
and emotionally with the fate of Muslims in faraway lands. In 
India this development was given a particular intensity, in part 
because the British empire played such a considerable role in the 
conquest of Muslim peoples and the decline of Muslim power, and 
in part because Indian Muslim themselves felt especially 
insecure.(26) 
     One development which expanded horizons was the increasing 
ease of travel that owed much to the shipping routes and railway 
lines that underpinned the trading and communications network of 
the empire. From the 1860s increasing numbers of Muslims went to 
Britain and to Europe to absorb Western learning or to train as 
lawyers and doctors. Others went to Cairo or Istanbul to pick up 
the latest in Muslim ideas. Many seized the opportunities created 
by empire to expand their trading communities around the Indian 
Ocean shore from Malaysia and Burma through the Gulf to East 
Africa. Many, too, as they formed half of the Indian army, found 
themselves fighting the empire's wars in South Africa or on the 
  
15
Western Front, but also against Muslims in Mesopotamia or on the 
North-West Frontier. But most important was the way in which 
improvements in sea travel enabled increasing numbers to perform 
the pilgrimage to Mecca. In good years tens of thousands 
performed their holy duty, some coming to settle in the Hijaz as 
scholars or traders.(27) 
     A second development of particular note was the construction 
of the Indo-European Telegraph line by a British government which 
had been made powerfully aware of the strategic benefits of the 
telegraph in the Mutiny Uprising.  From 1865 this made possible 
the rapid transmission of news to and from the subcontinent and 
gave a massive stimulus to the growth of the Muslim press. 
Indeed, there was a symbiotic relationship between the growth of 
pan-Islamic consciousness and the growth of the press which bears 
comparison with the relationship which Benedict Anderson has 
noted between the rapid march of print capitalism and the 
emergence of national consciousness in early modern Europe. The 
more Indian Muslims discovered about the fate of their brethren 
elsewhere in the Islamic world, the more they wished to know.  
When Russia and the Ottoman Empire went to war in the late 1870s, 
the press boomed.  When the British invaded Egypt in 1882, it 
boomed again. When the Ottoman Empire entered its terminal stages 
from 1911 onwards, the press boomed as never before. Great 
newspapers flourished - Abul Kalam Azad's al-Hilal, Muhammad 
`Ali's Comrade, Zafar `Ali Khan's Zamindar.(28) 
     The new mental horizons were not expressed just in a thirst 
for news of the Muslim world.  They were also expressed in the 
themes of some of the most successful novels of the time: 
Sarshar's (1845-1903) Fasana-yi Azad, written against the 
background of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 in which the 
eponymous hero goes off to the Crimean War to fight alongside the 
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British and Muslims against the Russians,(29) or the many 
historical romances of `Abd al-Halim Sharar (1860-1926),(30) 
which were set in all parts of the Muslim world. The leading 
Muslim historian of the day, Shibli Nu`mani (1857-1914) devoted 
his energies to reawakening interest in past Muslim lives and 
culture, especially the achievements of Arabs and Persians.(31) 
It was symptomatic that much of the more successful poetry had 
pan-Islamic themes; Hali's Musaddas, for instance, took the world 
by storm after its publication in 1879 going quickly through six 
editions.(32) While a vaunting Islam-wide vision pervades the 
poetry of Muhammad Iqbal.  When he wanted to emphasise the 
decline of Islam, he wrote a tearful poem about the end of Arab 
rule in Sicily; when he wanted to reflect on human creativity, he 
wrote his great poem on the mosque at Cordoba; moreover, he 
 
wrote much of his verse in Persian so as to reach an audience 
 
beyond the confines of India.(33)  
     Pan-Islamic concerns were also expressed in dress. The 
Turkish fez was part of the early uniform of Aligarh, as the 
movement identified with the Ottoman reformers. Muslim scholars 
in Lucknow followed clothing fashions in Egypt, Syria and 
Iran.(34)  While at the height of pan-Islamist activism in the 
second and third decades of the twentieth century Western-
educated Muslims made a point of shedding Western dress in favour 
of Muslim dress bearing distinctive Islamic symbols.  Such was 
the level of identification with the wider Muslim world that men 
and women were willing to spend huge resources in time and money 
to further pan-Islamic causes. One, at least, was driven to 
contemplating suicide when he heard in 1912 that the Bulgarians 
had advanced to just twenty-five miles from Istanbul.(35) 
     The most powerful expression of the pan-Islamic dimension to 
Muslim identity came with the period which stretched from the 
Balkan Wars in 1911 through to the abolition of the Turkish 
caliphate in 1924. Great organisations were founded to carry 
forward pan-Islamic purposes: there was the Red Crescent Mission 
in 1912 of Indian Muslim volunteers to provide medical services 
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to Turkish troops; there was the Anjuman-Khuddam-i Ka`aba founded 
in 1913 to protect and otherwise serve the holy places of Islam; 
there was the Indo-Ottoman Colonisation Society of 1914 which 
aimed to establish a pan-islamic settlement at Adana; and there 
was the Central Khilafat Committee founded in 1919 to protect the 
temporal and spiritual power of the Turkish caliphs. This last 
organisation swept aside the Muslim League and for two years 
dominated the Indian National Congress, playing the key role in 
enabling Gandhi to persuade it to adopt policies of non-co-
operation with government. The Khilafat movement, as it came to 
be known had mass appeal attracting not only the Western 
educated, traditionally educated, but also women and large 
numbers from the small towns and even the countryside. The 
movement went into decline from 1922, as the British arrested its 
leaders and the Turks moved towards abolishing the caliphate. 
Nevertheless, it was the most substantial mass movement in India 
since the Mutiny Uprising. And, even though it was profoundly 
bound up with Muslim unease about their position in India as well 
as being an expression of their opposition to British rule, it 
was also remarkable witness to their sensitivities to the Muslim 
world beyond the subcontinent.(36) 
     The failure of the Khilafat movement led to a reassessment 
of the pan-Islamic dimension of Muslim identity. Realising that 
there was no political salvation to be found in the wider Muslim 
world, Muslims made their pan-Islamic identity subordinate to a 
Muslim national identity, or an Indian National identity, or a 
socialist or even a communist one. Nevertheless, pan-Islam 
remained an important sub-strand in thought and action. It was 
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expressed in their concern over the future of Arabia in the 
1920s, in their support for the Muslim Congress movement - the 
forerunner of the Islamic Conference Organisation, in their 
ambitions to create a pan-Islamic university, and in their 
enormous interest in the fate of the Arabs under the Palestine 
mandate. It was also expressed in the pan-Islamic missions of 
Indian Muslim organisations, whether the unorthodox Ahmadiyya or 
the orthodox Tablighi Jama`at.(37)          
     
4.  British empire and the gendering of Muslim identity 
     One of the more striking developments in Muslim identity 
under British rule is its acquisition of a female dimension.  
Traditionally, if we can risk a brief flirtation with 
essentialism, Islamic law divided society into public and private 
realms.  The public realm was the key realm.  This was the world 
of the adult man, the place where Islamic social action took 
place and where the community visibly existed. It was to be 
distinguished from the domestic world wherein existed the weak -
women, children and slaves. Women in particular were seen as 
sources of fitna, social chaos, a threat to the moral order. The 
man's world was, therefore, the arena of Muslim identity. Here 
were the distinctive symbols of Muslim identity - mosque, madrasa 
and Sufi shrine.  Men, too, as Barbara Metcalf tells us, `learned 
Arabic and conventionally carried distinctive Islamic names; 
women knew the regional languages and their names often evoked 
only beautiful qualities or flowers.' (38) But under British rule 
women both become guardians of the shrine of Islam in domestic 
space and move into public space. Talk about women, indeed their 
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talk about themselves, increasingly fills public space, and their 
behaviour and deportment come to range amongst the most potent 
signifiers of Islamicity. This was a consequence, in part of the 
new ideas of womanhood and the status of women which were carried 
to India by official and non-official Britons, and in part of the 
way in which women became the prime site at which the 
intersecting discourses of colonialism and modernity (at the 
social level) took place.  The role of women became a key issue 
for Muslims as they considered how they should progress in the 
world.(39) 
     From the early nineteenth century the British brought issues 
regarding women into the public arena with their campaigns 
against the burning of widows, female infanticide, child marriage 
and female seclusion. Once the issues of sati and female 
infanticide had been addressed by the state, missionaries made 
much of the running. In the case of Muslims their particular 
concerns were bringing education to women, attacking seclusion, 
and improving knowledge about health and provision for it. There 
were zenana missions, zenana clubs, and even magazines especially 
for women. The twentieth century saw the state increasingly 
concerned to create greater opportunities for women. By the 1930s 
there were 2.5m girls in schools of which 0.5m were Muslims. 
Substantial attention was being paid to women's health issues, in 
particular maternity. Muslim women, moreover, were gaining 
specific state recognition in the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 
1929, the Shariat Application Act of 1937 and the Dissolution of 
Muslim Marriages Act of 1939. In the Government of India Act of 
1935, furthermore, they were acknowledged as having political 
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rights in seats specifically reserved for them. By the 1940s the 
public existence of Muslim women was widely acknowledged and the 
business of enlarging the space they occupied was now in the main 
the task of Muslims themselves.(40) 
    More important than the ideas that came to India from without 
in developing a female dimension to Muslim identity was the 
response of Muslim society to colonial rule. Reformist `ulama, 
confronted with the power of non-Muslims in public space, 
transform their womenfolk from being threats to the proper 
conduct of Islamic society to being central transmitters of 
Islamic values and symbols of Islamic identity. The classic 
statement of this new position is Mawlana Ashraf `Ali Thanwi's 
Bihishti Zewar, written in the first decade of the twentieth 
century, whose volume sales since are probably second only to the 
Quran. Thanwi's Muslim woman was to be able to read and write 
Urdu, perhaps to read Arabic, to fulfil her religious 
obligations, to keep her house in order, to bring up her children 
with due care, and to be able to sustain appropriate relations 
with those outside the household. She was regarded in being equal 
in responsibility and in human potential to men. But in a world 
in which the Muslim male might well be sullied by the compromises 
necessary to successful operation under colonial rule, she and 
her sisters became key sustainers of Islamic values.(41) 
      In the 1930s Mawlana Mawdudi, the founder of Islamism in 
India, gave a new twist to the central role of Muslim women.  
Whereas the reformist `ulama had generated their new role for 
Muslim women, as far as can be ascertained without reference to 
Western models, Mawdudi, as the classic statement of his position 
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Purdah and the Status of Women in Islam reveals, was obsessed by 
the freedoms permitted to women in the West.(42) He emphasises 
the natural superiority he saw Islam giving men over women.  The 
task of women was to run the home and their education should be 
limited to what was necessary to enable them to do so; they 
should not think of leaving it very much. This home, moreover, in 
the context of British rule and the films, dress, music and 
morals that came with it, had a very special part to play: `the 
harim', he declared,`is the strongest fortress of the Islamic 
civilization, which was built for the reason that, if it ever 
suffered a reverse, it may then take refuge in it.'(43) 
     While for the reforming `ulama and for Mawdudi women and 
their world became fortress Islam, for those Muslims who made 
Western standards a key criterion of progress, the `Western' 
education of their women and their entry into public space became 
increasingly a measure of their progress and modernity. This was 
very much part of the thinking of the Aligarh movement as it 
developed. If Sayyid Ahmed Khan, himself, thought that men 
deserved priority, this was less the concern of his followers. 
Nazir Ahmad, Hali, Shaykh `Abd Allah and Begum Shah Jahan of 
Bhopal. Their efforts led to the foundation of the Aligarh Girls 
School in 1906 which grew by 1937 to a College offering degree 
classes. Women in this circle and others carved out for 
themselves a literary space for themselves in short stories, 
novels and magazines such as Khatun, Ismat and Tehzib-un-Niswan. 
They also began to organise in public. In 1914 they All-India 
Muslim Ladies Conference was founded. Then for two decades Muslim 
identities tended to be subsumed within the larger female 
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identities of the leading women's organisations: the All-India 
Women's Conference, the Women's India Association and the 
National Council of Women of India. In the late 1930s, however, 
the common feminist front was destroyed by the communalisation of 
politics. In the campaign for Pakistan women played an active 
role on the streets.(44) 
     Colonial rule both brought Muslim women into public space 
and led to some Muslims elevating them into the bulwark of their 
capacity to defend their civilisation. One way or another women 
came to represent a substantial part of the Muslim identity. For 
Muslims and for Westerners the different roles which women filled 
in their social orders became prime markers of the differences 
between them. Equally for Muslims the different freedoms they 
gave their women became key markers of the differences amongst 
themselves. Of course, this is not a situation confined to 
British India, but one experienced in societies throughout the 
Muslim world. It is one, however, which has come to bear 
particularly heavily on Muslim women in the independent states of 
India and Pakistan.  In the former women have had to suffer, as 
in the Shah Bano case of 1986, because to subordinate Muslim 
personal law to the common civil code would mean an assault on 
Muslim identity. Indeed, for Hindu revivalists they have become 
the very epitome of what is wrong and bad about Muslim 
society.(45) In the latter women have had their freedoms 
sacrificed on the altar of the state's `Islamic identity'.(46) 
 
5.  British empire and a new sense of individualism 
     A further development of no little interest was the 
  
23
emergence of a new sense of self, of growing individualism.  Of 
course, this development was in very large part restricted to a 
small elite literate, for the most part, either in English or in 
Urdu, but it is nonetheless observable. Paradoxically, British 
rule and the Muslim movement of revival and reform both served to 
heighten forms of Islamic\Muslim identification, which in 
principle should have meant heightened willingness to subordinate 
individual will to that of the community, but they also created 
the conditions in which some Muslims increasingly came to assert 
their desire for individual fulfilment as against the broader 
claims of the Muslim community and its law. We see these 
developments in the emergence of Muslims who assert their right 
to interpret Islam for themselves, as opposed to accepting the 
interpretations of the `ulama, through to the emergence of 
growing numbers of those who were Muslims merely by culture.  In 
the later years of British rule such Muslims often held leftist 
views as progressive writers, socialists or communists. Amongst 
them there were also women concerned to raise and discuss in 
public issues which Muslims had traditionally kept concealed.(47) 
     In a broad sense the contributions of British rule to this 
development are not hard to discern. It was, of course, the prime 
channel through which the post-Enlightenment ideas of the West 
reached India - ideas of the rights of man and of personal 
fulfilment, vindications of earthly existence and earthly 
pleasures, and growing tendencies to celebrate not model lives 
but lives of all kinds. Such ideas were instinct in much Western 
literature and some of the institutions exported to South Asia. 
They were also represented in the behaviour and the attitudes of 
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a good number, though certainly not all, of the colonial British. 
These, however, were not the only sources of incipient Indian 
Muslim individualism. There was the spread of capitalist modes of 
production with their erosion of old communal loyalties and their 
empowerment of individuals. There was the emergence of the modern 
state with its growing capacity to reach down to each individual 
citizen. There was also the changes in the technology of 
communication, in particular the adoption of print, which enabled 
Muslims to command knowledge as never before and also to begin, 
as never before, the exploration of their inner selves.(48) 
     It would be simple to see the emergence of individualism as 
the outcome of the projection of British power into India. But it 
is also the outcome of major changes in Islamic culture, which we 
have already characterised as the shift from `other-worldly= to 
`this-worldly= Islam. The willed or `protestant' Islam, which was 
the central feature of `this-worldly' religion required Muslims 
to take action for Islam on earth if they were to achieved 
salvation. The link between salvation and work for Islam on 
earth, with no chance whatsoever of intercession, helped to set 
in motion processes that might underpin the development of a more 
individualistic Muslim self. Many of these processes bear 
comparison with those that led in the direction of individualism 
from the Reformation of Christian Europe. 
     Muslims were empowered by the thought that they and only 
they were responsible for shaping the earthly world. God gave his 
guidance, but they were the actors. The overwhelming 
responsibility placed on Muslims to act on earth runs through all 
manifestations of their movement of revival and reform. It is 
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well-expressed in the challenge which Iqbal makes man throw at 
God: 
           You created the night - I lit the lamp. 
           You created the clay - I moulded the cup. 
           You made the wilderness, mountains and forests 
           I cultivated the flowerbeds, parks and gardens.(49) 
Muslims who will their religion make their own choices. The more 
they do so the more they affirm their own autonomy, their own 
individuality. Once Muslims move down this path, there must 
always be the possibility that they will choose to express their 
individuality by choosing not to believe.  With the affirmation 
of the self, however achieved, there also comes the affirmation 
of the ordinary things of the self. A striking feature of 
twentieth-century Indo-Muslim culture has been the increasing 
valuing of ordinary human things: biographies of the Prophet talk 
about Him no longer as the Perfect Man but as the perfect family 
man; women have moved out of seclusion to demand that they and 
all things to do with them are given respect; even religious 
philosophers talk of finding God in all the mundane things of 
life. Then a willed religion had to be a self-conscious one. 
Muslims had to ask themselves regularly whether they had done all 
in their power to submit to God and carry out His will in the 
world. The ground was thus prepared for the `inward turn'; the 
self's inner landscape increasingly lay open for exploration. 
     `This-worldly' Islam made man the chief actor on earth, made 
his life the prime centre of meaning, and made it clear that he 
chose whether to enjoin the good and forbid the evil or not. 
Although designed to reinforce Islam, it also underpinned a 
valuing of individual desire which might run counter to community 
requirement. The tension, potential or actual, between individual 
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and community is acknowledged in much twentieth-century Muslim 
writing. Indeed, the tension is notably expressed in the 
stridency of some women's writing. It is a tension, moreover, 
which is broken as from time to time some Muslims burst through 
the bounds of community to embrace the world of unbelief and 
other beliefs that lies beyond.  In such ways the long term and 
unintended outcomes of Islamic reform might work together with 
influences channelled by the British from the West to bring 
various `secular' strands to Indo-Muslim identities.(50)         
                                 
 ***** 
 
     The period of British rule saw the emergence of new strands 
of identity among Indian Muslims. For many their religious 
identity became their prime identity. For a good number, too, 
their religious identity became their political identity. Muslim 
imagination expanded to embrace the lives and fate of Muslims 
elsewhere in the world; for some this became an all-absorbing 
concern.  Increasingly Muslim identity in public space acquired a 
feminine dimension. Moreover, individuals were beginning to 
emerge who wished to be treated as individuals; they rejected the 
demands made upon them by their `community' and resisted all 
stereotyping from without. It should be clear that not all 
Muslims were affected by all of these processes, and some by none 
of them.  In sum the period of British rule saw a particular 
privileging of the religious dimension of Muslim identities, but 
at the same time it also saw other strands emerged which Muslims 
might choose to emphasise. 
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     In each of the new strands of Muslim identity we have 
identified, we have discovered processes set going both by 
British rule and by religious and cultural change within Muslim 
society. These processes have both been independent of each other 
and have interacted with each other. Thus the sharpening of the 
distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim was both a consequence 
of British views of Indian society and of the impact of the 
Muslim movement of revival and reform; the development of a 
Muslim political identity was both a consequence of British 
policies towards Indian society and the fears of the north Indian 
Muslim elite; the emergence of a pan-Islamic dimension to Muslim 
identity was in part the outcome of the new world of Muslim 
communication enabled by British empire but in part too of the 
values and fears of Indian Muslims; the gendering of Muslim 
identity owed its development in part to new ideas of women's 
rights brought to India from the West but also to the new and 
special role given to women as Muslims sought to respond to 
British rule; and the new individualism (of at this stage but a 
few) certainly derived some impetus from the manifold impact of 
British empire on Indian society but also was instinct in the 
path of individual responsibility which `this-worldly' Islam set 
out for Muslims.  Finally, it may be instructive to place the 
Indo-Muslim experience in the wider context of British 
interactions with Muslims elsewhere in the empire.  It is 
arguable that India's Muslims were unique in the intensity of 
their self-conscious identity as Muslims.  They were notable in 
their development of a Muslim political identity. They were 
notable, certainly for a short period, in the intensity and 
  
28
impact of their pan-Islamic identity. On the other hand, they 
were less notable in the gendering of their identity and in the 
emergence of claims to individual expression as against community 
obligation.  This said, India appears unusual in the extent to 
which these latter two processes were also underpinned by 
developments within Muslim society itself. 
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